IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/ctswps/2012_021.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The political economy of infrastructure planning in Sweden: supporting analyses

Author

Abstract

We study factors affecting the choice of objects to be included in the National Transport Infrastructure Plans for 2004-2015 and for 2010-2021 in Sweden, controlling for the CBA results. The present working paper contains both a comparative analysis between the two Plans, and sensitivity analyses for the econometric regressions of the 2010-21 Plan conducted in Jussila Hammes (forthcoming). We find that the centre-right government tended to favour those counties that voted for it. Both a centre-right and a centre-left government have favoured rail investments over road. Lobbying also matters; projects with co-financing from the local municipality(ies) have a greater probability of being included in the Plan. Industry lobbying has at best a borderline significant effect and affects the probability of a project being included in the Plan positively.

Suggested Citation

  • Jussila Hammes, Johanna, 2012. "The political economy of infrastructure planning in Sweden: supporting analyses," Working papers in Transport Economics 2012:21, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2012_021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.transportportal.se/SWoPEc/CTS2012-21.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. Bent Flyvbjerg, 2009. "Survival of the unfittest: why the worst infrastructure gets built--and what we can do about it," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 25(3), pages 344-367, Autumn.
    3. Nyborg, Karine, 1998. "Some Norwegian Politicians' Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(3-4), pages 381-401, June.
    4. Leif Helland & Rune Sørensen, 2009. "Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 5-19, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jussila Hammes, Johanna, 2015. "Political economics or Keynesian demand-side policies: What determines transport infrastructure investment in Swedish municipalities?," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 49-60.
    2. Jussila Hammes , Johanna & Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2015. "The allocation of transport infrastructure in Swedish municipalities: welfare maximization, political economy or both?," Working papers in Transport Economics 2015:4, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jussila Hammes , Johanna & Mandell , Svante, 2016. "Districts’ co-financing of the central government," Working papers in Transport Economics 2016:12, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    2. Asplund, Disa & Eliasson, Jonas, 2016. "Does uncertainty make cost-benefit analyses pointless?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 195-205.
    3. Sandberg Hanssen, Thor-Erik & Jørgensen, Finn, 2015. "Transportation policy and road investments," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 49-57.
    4. Jussila Hammes, Johanna & Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2016. "The allocation of transport infrastructure in Swedish municipalities: Welfare maximization, political economy or both?," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 7, pages 53-64.
    5. Jussila Hammes, Johanna & Volden, Gro Holst & Welde, Morten & Börjesson, Maria & Odeck, James, 2021. "Finding transport projects with high value for money : what are the socio-geographic determinants?," Working Papers 2021:4, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
    6. Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Fridstrøm, Lasse, 2019. "Explaining low economic return on road investments. New evidence from Norway," MPRA Paper 94389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Jussila Hammes , Johanna & Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2015. "The allocation of transport infrastructure in Swedish municipalities: welfare maximization, political economy or both?," Working papers in Transport Economics 2015:4, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    8. Tan Ngoc Vu & Duc Hong Vo & Michael McAleer, 2019. "Rent seeking for export licenses: Application to the Vietnam rice market," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2019-13, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    9. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    10. Sébastien Jean & David Laborde & Will Martin, 2008. "Choosing Sensitive Agricultural Products in Trade Negotiations," Working Papers 2008-18, CEPII research center.
    11. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 3, pages 37-63, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 667-690, September.
    13. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2010. "Businessman Candidates," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 718-736, July.
    14. Paolo Manasse, 2005. "Deficit Limits, Budget Rules, and Fiscal Policy," IMF Working Papers 2005/120, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Mary Amiti & Jozef Konings, 2007. "Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Productivity: Evidence from Indonesia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1611-1638, December.
    16. Chris Milner, 2013. "Declining Protection in Developing Countries: Fact or Fiction?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(6), pages 689-700, June.
    17. Rotunno, Lorenzo, 2016. "Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 133-148.
    18. Bin, Sheng, 2000. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China," Working Papers 10/2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy.
    19. Mostafa Beshkar & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2017. "Dispute Settlement with Second-Order Uncertainty: The Case of International Trade Disputes," CAEPR Working Papers 2017-010, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    20. Bonomo, Marco Antônio Cesar & Terra, Maria Cristina T., 2005. "Special interests and political business cycles," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 597, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transport infrastructure plan; Lobbying; Co-financing; Freight benefits; Politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2012_021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CTS (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.cts.kth.se/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.