Production, Exchange, and Appropriation in a Hawk-Dove Economy

We derive the payoffs of a hawk-dove game based upon production, exchange, and appropriation possibilities. We then link the evolutionary equilibrium of the game to economy-wide fundamentals: production, volume of trade, security of property, welfare, and the extent of hawks in the economy. Within the model we show how hawk-like behavior can be subdued by the potential of mutually beneficial exchange. The model also identifies the conditions under which appropriation possibilities are so large that hawk-like play comes to dominate the economy. We discover, under certain conditions, that an increase in each agent's productivity in its comparative advantage good reduces production and welfare. When increases in productivity result in less production and welfare, the hawk-dove society is plagued by immiserizing growth. The productivity increases which leads to immiserizing growth occur just prior to a productivity cusp that, if reached, vaults the hawk-dove economy to a dramatically improved state.