Optimal Tax-Transfer-Schemes under Partial Information
AbstractAccording to a widely held belief, all who are able to work, should work . We consider this statement within a framework of non-linear taxation. The crucial differ-ence between our model and the standard model is that the government can distinguish between productive persons and the disabled. A general proposition regarding the design of tax-transfer-schemes under such partial information is derived. Moreover, it is shown that unemployment on the side of the productive poor may still be optimal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) with number dp-298.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
Optimal Taxation; Employment; Poverty; Welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Homburg & Tim Lohse, 2005. "Optimal Taxes and Transfers under Partial Information," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 225(6), pages 622-629, November.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
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