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Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support

Author

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  • Mostapha Diss

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi

    (SEED - Social Equilibrium and Economic Decisions - UPNA - Universidad Pública de Navarra [Espagne] = Public University of Navarra, PRESAD - PReferencias, Elección Social y Ayuda a la Decisión - UVa - Universidad de Valladolid [Valladolid])

Abstract

Computer simulations are used to evaluate the likelihood of consistent outcomes under the class of majorities based on difference in support. These majorities require certain consensus in collective preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. More precisely, individuals show preference intensities in the unit interval among each pair of alternatives and it is required that the winner alternative obtains a difference in the sum of the intensities with respect to the loser alternative. This difference is a real number located between 0 and the total number of voters. We introduce the values of the required threshold for which majorities based on difference in support lead to transitive and triple-acyclic collective decisions with a probability of 1. Our results improve the previous theoretical ones since they require softer thresholds to reach consistent collective decisions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support," Post-Print halshs-01289319, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01289319
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-015-9467-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Garcia-Lapresta, Jose Luis & Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2001. "Majority decisions based on difference of votes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 463-481, June.
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