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Les Enjeux Et Les Outils De L'Information Du Conseil D'Administration, Application Au Cas Enron

Author

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  • Benoit Pigé

    (L.I.B.R.E. - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

L'approche du rôle du conseil d'administration adoptée à partir des concepts du gouvernement d'entreprise tend à privilégier une vision de l'entreprise très orientée vers les actionnaires. L'information à destination des administrateurs apparaît alors comme devant permettre prioritairement de défendre les intérêts de ces actionnaires. En adoptant à l'inverse une approche de l'entreprise élargie à l'ensemble des acteurs de l'organisation, il devient alors nécessaire de concevoir un système d'information susceptible de fournir aux administrateurs les données dont ils ont besoin pour pouvoir apprécier la performance de l'entreprise, la contribution des différents acteurs à cette performance et la capacité du dirigeant à créer de la valeur à partir des ressources de l'entreprise

Suggested Citation

  • Benoit Pigé, 2002. "Les Enjeux Et Les Outils De L'Information Du Conseil D'Administration, Application Au Cas Enron," Post-Print halshs-00584523, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00584523
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00584523
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    References listed on IDEAS

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