Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Controlling Shareholders and the Acquisition Premiums Paid in European Takeover Bids

Contents:

Author Info

  • M.F. Thraya

    (CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - CNRS : UMR5820 - Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II)

  • J. Hagendorff

    (The University of Edinburgh BS - Business School)

Abstract

This paper examines the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. We investigate the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with concentrated voting rights structures. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the bidder's concentration of both voting rights and excess voting rights over cash-flow rights. With higher levels of bidder entrenchment, the valuation of a takeover target increasingly reflects the private benefits of control which bidders seek to extract from a deal

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/53/47/63/PDF/cr_2010_10_E2.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00534763.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00534763

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00534763/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: Controlling shareholders ; separation between the ownership and the control ; takeover premiums ; private benefits;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00534763. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.