Controlling Shareholders and the Acquisition Premiums Paid in European Takeover Bids
AbstractThis paper examines the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. We investigate the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with concentrated voting rights structures. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the bidder's concentration of both voting rights and excess voting rights over cash-flow rights. With higher levels of bidder entrenchment, the valuation of a takeover target increasingly reflects the private benefits of control which bidders seek to extract from a deal
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Date of creation: 2010
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Controlling shareholders ; separation between the ownership and the control ; takeover premiums ; private benefits;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-11-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EUR-2010-11-20 (Microeconomic European Issues)
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