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La lutte contre le blanchiment

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  • Pierre Kopp

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Puisque le système financier est investi par l'argent issu du trafic de drogue, il convient de redessiner les mécanismes de protections légaux. C'est à partir de ce constat, formulé au début des années 90, par les dirigeants internationaux que la lutte contre le blanchiment a pris l'importance que l'on sait. Avec le recul, il s'avère que les fonds destinés à être blanchi ne proviennent pas majoritairement du trafic de drogue mais de la fraude fiscale et de la corruption. Ainsi, nous montrerons pourquoi les trafiquants de drogue ne tentent pas de blanchir 125 milliards de dollars, comme l'affirmait le Gafi (Groupe d'Action Financière Internationale), en 1989, et comment ils préfèrent des méthodes de blanchiment souvent assez primitives plutôt que les techniques les plus sophistiquées offertes par le système financier moderne. Une fois l'ampleur des sommes effectivement concernées précisée, nous procèderons à une analyse comparative du dispositif anglo-saxon et continental de lutte contre le blanchiment. Notre démarche est essentiellement analytique et s'appuie sur la théorie économique dont la particularité est de tenter d'interpréter le comportement des acteurs du blanchiment comme le résultat d'un jeu d'incitations où le profit et le risque sont les deux variables essentielles. Bien qu'un peu abrupte, la méthode consistant à comparer le système anglo-saxon et son homologue continental permet de faire ressortir des différences intéressantes. Le modèle anglo-saxon fait un usage important de la responsabilité pénale de la personne morale et vise à moraliser le système bancaire en faisant planer la menace de la sanction pénale. La menace est d'autant plus crédible qu'il suffit que le personnel d'une banque, (sans que la banque en tire elle-même un bénéfice), profite d'un défaut de surveillance, pour que la responsabilité de cette dernière soit engagée. A l'inverse, le système continental permet certes d'engager la responsabilité de la personne morale, mais repose, pour l'essentiel, sur un dispositif d'auto moralisation du système, où la peur de la perte de réputation remplace la sanction pénale. À l'heure où l'on s'interroge sur les mérites comparés des droits et où la tentation d'importer des éléments du dispositif nord- américain vers la France est particulièrement forte, l'analyse comparative prend un sel particulier.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Kopp, 2006. "La lutte contre le blanchiment," Post-Print halshs-00263618, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00263618
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00263618
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Slim, Sadri, 2011. "Los efectos macroeconómicos del lavado de dinero [Macroeonomic Effects of Money Laundering]," MPRA Paper 37031, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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