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Electoral reform: the case for majority judgment

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  • Rida Laraki

    (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The majority judgment (MJ) voting method works well in theory and in practice. Not only does MJ avoid the classical Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, but it also overcomes the domination paradox, from which paired comparisons by majority rule, approval voting, and all Condorcet consistent methods suffer. This article also shows why MJ best reduces the impact of strategic manipulation and minimizes ties to the extreme. The article illustrates the resistance of MJ to manipulations in a real example, discusses other salient properties of MJ, and summarizes several recent applications that show MJ to be, despite its newness, the right basis of electoral reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Rida Laraki, 2022. "Electoral reform: the case for majority judgment," Post-Print hal-04304795, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04304795
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09385-7
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04304795
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vincent Pons & Clémence Tricaud, 2018. "Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1621-1649, September.
    2. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015137, December.
    3. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Election by Majority Judgment: Experimental Evidence," Studies in Public Choice, in: Bernard Dolez & Bernard Grofman & Annie Laurent (ed.), In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform, chapter 0, pages 13-54, Springer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Majority Judgment; Arrow paradox; Domination paradox; Resistance to strategy; Range voting; Approval voting; Rank choice voting; Condorcet paradox;
    All these keywords.

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