Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing
AbstractIn Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank. They find that the traditional model--transforming the "preference lists" of individuals into a "preference list" of society--is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. Balinski and Laraki propose a more realistic model. It leads to an entirely new theory and method--majority judgment--proven superior to all known methods. It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet's and Arrow's. They offer theoretical, practical, and experimental evidence--from national elections to figure skating competitions--to support their arguments. Drawing on insights from wine, sports, music, and other competitions, Balinski and Laraki argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking, but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors. The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm--to compare--is replaced by a new paradigm--to evaluate.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by The MIT Press in its series MIT Press Books with number 0262015137 and published in 2011.
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu
Find related papers by JEL classification:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marcus Pivato, 2013.
"Voting rules as statistical estimators,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 581-630, February.
- Paul Edelman, 2012. "The institutional dimension of election design," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 287-293, December.
- Bora Erdamar & José Luis Garcia-Lapresta & David Pérez-Roman & Remzi Sanver, 2012. "Measuring consensus in a preference-approval context," Working Papers hal-00681297, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Furbush).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.