IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-02629727.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Préférences individuelles et incitations collectives : quels contrats agroenvironnementaux pour la réduction des herbicides par les viticulteurs ?

Author

Listed:
  • Laure Kuhfuss

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

  • Raphaële Préget

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

  • Sophie Thoyer

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

The CAP reform is an opportunity to improve the design of existing agri-environmental schemes. Understanding the design attributes affecting farmers' choices when they adopt an agri-environmental contract can help to identify ways of increasing their participation. The aim of this article is to measure with a choice experiment, the preferences of wine-growers for different types of contracts limiting the use of herbicides in the Languedoc-Roussillon region (France). We test the effect of introducing a collective dimension in the contracts. A monetary "bonus" would be paid to each engaged farmer, provided that the proportion of land collectively enrolled in the scheme reaches a predefined threshold. Despite a high heterogeneity among wine-growers, respondents show a preference for the contracts including this bonus and are more willing to provide environmental efforts when their neighbors also do so. Then, the presence of this bonus in the contracts terms could enhance farmers' participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Laure Kuhfuss & Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2014. "Préférences individuelles et incitations collectives : quels contrats agroenvironnementaux pour la réduction des herbicides par les viticulteurs ?," Post-Print hal-02629727, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02629727
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Caroline Roussy & Aude Ridier & Karim Chaïb, 2014. "Adoption d’innovations par les agriculteurs : rôle des perceptions et des préférences," Post-Print hal-01123427, HAL.
    2. Luc Behaghel & Karen Macours & Julie Subervie, 2018. "Can RCTs help improve the design of CAP," Working Papers hal-01974425, HAL.
    3. Philippe Le Coent & Raphaële Preget & Sophie S. Thoyer, 2018. "Do farmers follow the herd? The influence of social norms in the participation to agri-environmental schemes," Working Papers halshs-01936004, HAL.
    4. Le Coent, Philippe & Préget, Raphaële & Thoyer, Sophie, 2017. "Compensating Environmental Losses Versus Creating Environmental Gains: Implications for Biodiversity Offsets," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 120-129.
    5. Luc Behaghel & Karen Macours & Julie Subervie, 2019. "How can randomised controlled trials help improve the design of the common agricultural policy?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 46(3), pages 473-493.
    6. G. Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi & Sophie Thoyer, 2015. "Using monetary incentives in agri-environmental policies: Can we do more with less? [Les incitations monétaires dans la politique agro-environnementale : peut-on faire mieux avec moins ?]," Post-Print hal-01884947, HAL.
    7. Calvet, Coralie & Le Coent, Philippe & Napoleone, Claude & Quétier, Fabien, 2019. "Challenges of achieving biodiversity offset outcomes through agri-environmental schemes: Evidence from an empirical study in Southern France," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 113-125.
    8. GROLLEAU, Gilles & MZOUGHI, Naoufel & THOYER, Sophie, 2015. "Les incitations monétaires dans la politique agro-environnementale : peut-on faire mieux avec moins ?," Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement (RAEStud), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 96(2), June.
    9. Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio & Sagebiel, Julian & Rommel, Jens & Olschewski, Roland, 2021. "Types of collective action problems and farmers’ willingness to accept agri-environmental schemes in Switzerland," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    10. Philippe Coent & Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2021. "Farmers Follow the Herd: A Theoretical Model on Social Norms and Payments for Environmental Services," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(2), pages 287-306, February.
    11. Pellegrin, Claire & Grolleau, Gilles & Mzoughi, Naoufel & Napoleone, Claude, 2018. "Does the Identifiable Victim Effect Matter for Plants? Results From a Quasi-experimental Survey of French Farmers," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 106-113.
    12. Philippe Le Coent & Coralie Calvet, 2016. "Challenges of achieving biodiversity offsetting through agri-environmental schemes: evidence from an empirical study," Working Papers 16-10, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier.
    13. Jesus Lozano Vita & Florence Jacquet & Sophie Thoyer, 2017. "Choix de pratiques des viticulteurs et facteurs comportementaux : une approche par la modélisation multi-objectif," Post-Print hal-02738164, HAL.
    14. Laure Kuhfuss & Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer & Nick Hanley, 2015. "Nudging farmers to sign agri-environmental contracts: the effects of a collective bonus," Working Papers hal-01148581, HAL.
    15. Philippe Coent, 2023. "Payment for environmental services related to aquifers: a review of specific issues and existing programmes," Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies, Springer, vol. 104(3), pages 273-310, December.
    16. Philippe Le Coent & Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2016. "Do social norms influence farmers’ participation in agri-environmental schemes?," Post-Print hal-02743066, HAL.
    17. Philippe Le Coent & Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2018. "Do farmers follow the herd? The influence of social norms in the participation to agri-environmental schemes," Working Papers hal-02791014, HAL.
    18. Philippe Le Coent & Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2015. "Can collective conditionality improve agri-environmental contracts? Insights from experimental economics," Post-Print hal-01606341, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02629727. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.