IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00723189.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Existence of an Equilibrium for Lower Semicontinuous Information Acquisition Functions

Author

Listed:
  • Agnes Bialecki

    (ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon)

  • Eleonore Haguet

    (ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique)

  • Gabriel Turinici

    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider a two-period model in which a continuum of agents trade in a context of costly information acquisition and systematic heterogeneous expectations biases. Because of systematic biases agents are supposed not to learn from others' decisions. In a previous work under somehow strong technical assumptions a market equilibrium was proved to exist and the supply and demand functions were proved to be strictly monotonic with respect to the price. Here we extend these results under very weak technical assumptions. We also prove that the equilibrium price maximizes the trading volume and further additional properties (such as the antimonotonicity of the trading volume with respect to the marginal information price).

Suggested Citation

  • Agnes Bialecki & Eleonore Haguet & Gabriel Turinici, 2014. "Existence of an Equilibrium for Lower Semicontinuous Information Acquisition Functions," Post-Print hal-00723189, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00723189
    DOI: 10.1155/2014/268427
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00723189v3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00723189v3/document
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1155/2014/268427?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Pagano, 1989. "Endogenous Market Thinness and Stock Price Volatility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(2), pages 269-287.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    3. Stephen Morris, 1996. "Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 1111-1133.
    4. Peng, Lin, 2005. "Learning with Information Capacity Constraints," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 307-329, June.
    5. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-738, August.
    6. Ko, K. Jeremy & (James) Huang, Zhijian, 2007. "Arrogance can be a virtue: Overconfidence, information acquisition, and market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 529-560, May.
    7. Grossman, Sanford, 1978. "Further results on the informational efficiency of competitive stock markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 81-101, June.
    8. Ho-Mou Wu & Wen-Chung Guo, 2004. "Asset price volatility and trading volume with rational beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(4), pages 795-829, May.
    9. Sanford J. Grossman, 1977. "The Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational Externalities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 431-449.
    10. Abarbanell, Jeffery S. & Lanen, William N. & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1995. "Analysts' forecasts as proxies for investor beliefs in empirical research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 31-60, July.
    11. Laura L. Veldkamp, 2006. "Media Frenzies in Markets for Financial Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 577-601, June.
    12. Ho-Mou Wu & Wen-Chung Guo, 2003. "Speculative trading with rational beliefs and endogenous uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 263-292, March.
    13. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Equilibrium, Price Formation, and the Value of Private Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 1-16.
    14. Krebs, Tom, 2007. "Rational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 532-548, June.
    15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7431 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Grossman, Sanford J, 1976. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades Have Diverse Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 573-585, May.
    17. Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. "Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1415-1430, November.
    18. Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Divergence of Opinion in Complete Markets: A Note," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(1), pages 309-317, March.
    19. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1993. "Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 473-506.
    20. Wang, Jiang, 1994. "A Model of Competitive Stock Trading Volume," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 127-168, February.
    21. Min Shen & Gabriel Turinici, 2012. "Liquidity generated by heterogeneous beliefs and costly estimations," Post-Print hal-00638966, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Angus A Brown & L C G Rogers, 2010. "Diverse Beliefs," Papers 1001.1450, arXiv.org.
    2. Wen-Chung Guo & Sy-Ming Guu & Ting-Yun Chang, 2011. "Equilibrium Information Acquisition, Prediction Abilities and Asset Prices," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 37(1), pages 89-111, January.
    3. Mordecai Kurz, 2007. "Rational Diverse Beliefs and Economic Volatility," Discussion Papers 06-045, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
    5. Avdis, Efstathios, 2016. "Information tradeoffs in dynamic financial markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 568-584.
    6. Kurz, Mordecai, 2008. "Beauty contests under private information and diverse beliefs: How different?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 762-784, July.
    7. Vayanos, Dimitri & Wang, Jiang, 2013. "Market Liquidity—Theory and Empirical Evidence ," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1289-1361, Elsevier.
    8. Blankespoor, Elizabeth & deHaan, Ed & Marinovic, Iván, 2020. "Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2).
    9. Wen-Chung Guo & Frank Wang & Ho-Mou Wu, 2011. "Financial leverage and market volatility with diverse beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 337-364, June.
    10. Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell, 2010. "Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets," NBER Working Papers 15783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Mordecai Kurz & Maurizio Motolese, 2011. "Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 293-335, June.
    12. Albert Wang, F., 1998. "Strategic trading, asymmetric information and heterogeneous prior beliefs," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 321-352, September.
    13. Michele Berardi, 2021. "Learning from prices: information aggregation and accumulation in an asset market," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-77, March.
    14. Gabriel Desgranges & Céline Rochon, 2013. "Conformism and public news," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 1061-1090, April.
    15. Basak, Suleyman, 2000. "A model of dynamic equilibrium asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs and extraneous risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 63-95, January.
    16. Juan Dubra & Helios Herrera, 2002. "Market Participation, Information and Volatility," Working Papers 0206, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    17. Basak, Suleyman, 2005. "Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 2849-2881, November.
    18. Nezafat, Mahdi & Schroder, Mark, 2023. "The negative value of private information in illiquid markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    19. Jung-Wook Kim & Jason Lee & Randall Morck, 2009. "Characteristics of Observed Limit Order Demand and Supply Schedules for Individual Stocks," NBER Working Papers 14733, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Anzhela Knyazeva & Diana Knyazeva & Leonard Kostovetsky, 2018. "Investor heterogeneity and trading," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 24(4), pages 680-718, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    information acquisition; heterogeneous beliefs; heterogeneous estimations; Grossman-Stiglitz paradox; costly information;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00723189. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.