On the value of randomization
AbstractAn optimal contract may involve randomization when the agents differ in their attitudes towards risk, so that randomization enables the principal to relax the incentive constraints. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for local random deviations to be welfare improving in a neighborhood of a nonrandom optimum.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00639834.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00639834
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Random taxation; stochastic contract; second best; tax evasion.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Philippe Choné & Romain De Nijs & Lionel Wilner, 2012. "Intertemporal Pricing with Unobserved Consumer Arrival Times," Working Papers 2012-23, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.