The Causal Effect of Market Participation on Trust: An Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control
AbstractIn randomized control laboratory experiments, we find that those primed to think about markets exhibit more trusting behavior. We randomly and unconsciously prime experimental participants to think about markets and trade. We then ask them to play a trust game involving an anonymous stranger. We compare the behavior of these individuals with that of a group who are not primed to think about anything in particular. Priming for market participation affects positively the beliefs about the trustworthiness of anonymous strangers, increasing trust.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science in its series Working Papers with number 1027.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
trust; markets; institutions; belief; priming;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- P10 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-10-09 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-10-09 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-10-09 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-10-09 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Eric Schniter & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension," Working Papers 14-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2012. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 368-425, June.
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