Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Marginal tax rates, tax revenues and inequality. Reagan’s fiscal policy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Elena Briata

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of Reagan’s fiscal Reform. It mainly involves an investigation of the legislative features of the Reform and of the underpinning economical theory. The study focuses on the impact of such a Reform on the economy. The paper comprises four main parts. The first part is devoted to the analysis of both Reagan’s fiscal policy actions in the 1980s and of the regulatory touch. In particular the first part investigates two main Laws, which reduced private marginal tax rates: the Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981) and the Tax Reform Act (1986). The second part introduces and analyses the so-called “Supply-Side Economics”, the main theory on which Reagan's Reform is based. Indeed the core of “Supply-Side Economics” was the “Laffer Curve” where tax rate cuts played a central role. The last two parts deal with the concrete effects of private marginal tax rate cuts. In particular, inequality and fiscal revenue. It also focuses on the criticisms against the Reform. Fiscal revenue is observed in a wider context. The paper first investigates the source of the deficits recorded during the 1980s. It relates these deficits to general government revenues and general government expenditures. Subsequently, general government revenues are broken down into their parts and the development of federal income tax revenue is carefully observed. Inequality is investigated through the Gini index. The paper touches briefly on the changes to the Gini index after Reagan’s two main fiscal Laws took effect. Furthermore, inequality is related to the progression of the tax system and then calculated through the Reynolds-Smolensky Index.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.dep.unige.it/RePEc/gea/wpaper/dwpo-4-jul2011.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Genoa, Research Doctorate in Public Economics in its series DEP - series of economic working papers with number 4/2011.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Jul 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:gea:wpaper:4/2011

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: University of Genoa c/o Marcello Montefiori via Vivaldi, 5 16126 Genova ITALY
    Phone: 010-209-5221
    Fax: +39 010 209 5223
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.dep.unige.it/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Reagan’s fiscal policy; supply-side economics; revenue; inequality;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Feldstein, Martin, 1976. "On the theory of tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 77-104.
    2. Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, 2000. "Does Growing Inequality Reduce Tax Progressivity? Should It?," NBER Working Papers 7576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Feldstein, Martin, 1986. "Supply Side Economics: Old Truths and New Claims," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 26-30, May.
    4. Don Fullerton & James B. Mackie, 1988. "Economic Efficiency in Recent Tax Reform History: Policy Reversals or Consistent Improvements?," NBER Working Papers 2593, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Austan Goolsbee, 2000. "What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 352-378, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gea:wpaper:4/2011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcello Montefiori).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.