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Do broad patents deter research cooperation ?

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  • Trommetter, M.
  • Tropéano, J.P.

Abstract

The authors develop a theoretical model where two competing firms need access to basic knowledge that only one firm owns. They determine the impact of an imperfect property right on the incentive to transfer that knowledge to the competitor. They compare these transfer strategies. (i) Patenting may lead to litigation costs that depend on the competition toughness. (ii) Keeping the knowledge secret involves no licence revenue but ensures a monopoly profit. (iii) The firm can also coooperate with the competitor and thereby avoids litigation. They show that whenever competition between both firms is low, making patentable basic knowledge promotes knowledge transfer through research cooperation.

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File URL: http://www.grenoble.inra.fr/Docs/pub/A2009/gael2009-07.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200904.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200904

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Related research

Keywords: INNOVATION; SECRET; PATENT; cooperation; KNOWLEDGE SHARING;

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  1. Llobet, Gerard, 2003. "Patent litigation when innovation is cumulative," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1135-1157, October.
  2. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2006. "Patents vs. Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(6), pages 1112-1147, December.
  3. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-69, September.
  4. Trommetter, M., 2004. "Biodiversity and international stakes : a question of access," Working Papers 200418, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  5. Trommetter, M., 2008. "Intellectual property rights in agricultural and agro-food biotechnologies to 2030 (© OECD International Futures Programme)," Working Papers 200805, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  6. D'ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1465, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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