Do broad patents deter research cooperation ?
AbstractThe authors develop a theoretical model where two competing firms need access to basic knowledge that only one firm owns. They determine the impact of an imperfect property right on the incentive to transfer that knowledge to the competitor. They compare these transfer strategies. (i) Patenting may lead to litigation costs that depend on the competition toughness. (ii) Keeping the knowledge secret involves no licence revenue but ensures a monopoly profit. (iii) The firm can also coooperate with the competitor and thereby avoids litigation. They show that whenever competition between both firms is low, making patentable basic knowledge promotes knowledge transfer through research cooperation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200904.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1241 rue des Résidences, Domaine Universitaire, 38400 Saint Martin d'Hères
Phone: (0033) 4 76 82 54 39
Web page: http://www.grenoble.inra.fr/
More information through EDIRC
INNOVATION; SECRET; PATENT; cooperation; KNOWLEDGE SHARING;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-09-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2009-09-11 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-09-11 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-TID-2009-09-11 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- D'ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, .
"Bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1465, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008.
"How Strong Are Weak Patents?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-69, September.
- Trommetter, Michel, 2005.
"Biodiversity and international stakes: A question of access,"
Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 573-583, June.
- Trommetter, M., 2004. "Biodiversity and international stakes : a question of access," Working Papers 200418, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2006.
"Patents vs. Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 4(6), pages 1112-1147, December.
- Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Patents vs Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover," Working Papers w0064, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), revised Feb 2006.
- Llobet, Gerard, 2003. "Patent litigation when innovation is cumulative," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1135-1157, October.
- Trommetter, M., 2008. "Intellectual property rights in agricultural and agro-food biotechnologies to 2030 (© OECD International Futures Programme)," Working Papers 200805, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Agnès Vertier).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.