The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index
AbstractThe paper concerns a certain modification of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index - a notion defined for a social network of players. In the original Hoede-Bakker set up, preferences of players are involved. It is assumed that a player has an inclination either to accept or to reject a proposal, but due to the influence of others, his final decision may be different from his original inclination. In this paper, we propose the not-preference-based (NPB) generalized Hoede-Bakker index, where feasible strategies instead of players’ inclinations are considered. We show that if all feasible strategy profiles are equally probable, then the NPB generalized Hoede-Bakker index is a ‘net’ Success, i.e., ‘Success - Failure’, where Success and Failure of a player is defined as the probability that the player is successful and fails, respectively. Moreover, under the assumption of equal probabilities of all feasible strategy profiles, we show that the probability that a player is lucky (Luck) equals the probability that he fails (Failure). Since Success - Luck = Decisiveness, it follows that, under the same assumption, the NPB generalized Hoede-Bakker index is equal to the probability that a player is decisive.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 0704.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
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Hoede-Bakker index; feasible strategy; success; failure; decisiveness;
Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-03-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2007-03-24 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
- Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007.
UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
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