Specific Investments, Contracts, And Opportunism: The Evolution Of Railroad Sidetrack Agreements
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division in its series Papers with number 90-6.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ANTITRUST DIVISION, JUDICIARY CENTER BUILDING 555 4TH ST. N.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20001 U.S.A..
Web page: http://www.justice.gov/atr/
More information through EDIRC
contracts ; railways ; investments;
Other versions of this item:
- Pittman, Russell, 1992. "Specific Investments, Contracts, and Opportunism: The Evolution of Railroad Sidetrack Agreements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 565-89, October.
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- McCann, Laura & Colby, Bonnie & Easter, K. William & Kasterine, Alexander & Kuperan, K.V., 2005. "Transaction cost measurement for evaluating environmental policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 527-542, March.
- Affuso, Luisa & Newbery, David M G, 2000. "Investment, Reprocurement and Franchise Contract Length in the British Railway Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 2619, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
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- Ciccotello, Conrad S. & Muscarella, Chris J., 2001. "Contracts between managers and investors: a study of master limited partnership agreements," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 1-23, March.
- Francine Lafontaine & Scott E. Masten, 2002. "Contracting in the Absence of Specific Investments and Moral Hazard: Understanding Carrier-Driver Relations in U.S. Trucking," NBER Working Papers 8859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Riccardo Cappellin & Eugenio Corti & Massimiliano Bianca, 2006. "Strategy for Innovation and Knowledge Creation in the Aeronautical Industrial Cluster in Campania Region," ERSA conference papers ersa06p643, European Regional Science Association.
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