Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly
AbstractThe paper considers an oligopolistic industry in which pollution is a by-product of production. Firms are assumed to have emission permits that restrict the amount that they pollute. These permits are assumed to be tradeable and the paper discusses a structure in which the same set of firms operates both in the product market as well as in the pollution permits market. The paper demonstrates that in such a structure allowing trade in emission permits is not necessarily beneficial. In particular it may lead to the choice of inferior production and abatement technologies, it may lead to a market equilibrium with lower output rates and higher prices and it may result in a shift of production from a low cost to a high cost firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 45-95.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Tel-Aviv University, The Sackler Institute of Economic Studies, Ramat Aviv 69 978 Tel-Aviv, Israel
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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