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Monetary Contracting between Central Banks and the Design of Sustainable Exchange-Rate Zones (Reprint 035)

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Author Info
Francisco Delgado
Bernard Dumas
Abstract

An exchange-rate system is a set of contracts which commits Central Banks to intervene in the foreign-exchange market. The design features of the system include: the rules of intervention, the limits placed on exchange rates and the "crisis scenario" which describes possible transitions to new regimes in case one Central bank runs out of reserves or borrowing capacity. This paper considers the various trade-offs one faces in designing an exchange-rate system. Svensson (1989) has already analyzed the degree of variability in the exchange rate, the interest rate and the fundamentals. But the tradeoff also pertains to the amount of reserves which the Central banks must have on hand in order to forestall a speculative attack and make the system sustainable. The amount of reserves needed depends crucially on the assumed crisis scenario.

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Paper provided by Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research in its series Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers with number 20-90.

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Handle: RePEc:fth:pennfi:20-90

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  1. Giuseppe Bertola & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1991. "Stochastic Devaluation Risk and the Empirical Fit of Target Zone Models," NBER Working Papers 3576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Elias Belessakos & Rahim Loufir, 1993. "Exchange Rate Target Zones in a Utility Maximizing Framework," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 31, pages 02, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bernard Dumas & L. Peter Jennergren & Bertil Naslund, 1993. "Currency Option Pricing in Credible Target Zones," NBER Working Papers 4522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1990. "The Foreign Exchange Risk Premium in a Target Zone with Devaluation Risk," NBER Working Papers 3466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Dominique Hachette & Fernando Ossa & Francisco Rosende, 1996. "Aspectos Monetarios y Macroeconómicos de la Integración," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 33(98), pages 153-183. [Downloadable!]
  6. Willem H. Buiter & Paolo A. Pesenti, 1990. "Rational Speculative Bubbles in an Exchange Rate Target Zone," NBER Working Papers 3467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Bernard Dumas & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1994. "How Long do Unilateral Target Zones Last?," NBER Working Papers 3931, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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