This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Menachem Brenner
Rangarajan K. Sundaram
David Yermack

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper examines the practice of resetting of the terms of previously-issued executive stock options. We identify the properties of the typical reset option, characterize the firms that have reset options, and develop a model to value options that may be reset. In our sample of 396 executives whose options had terms reset in 1992-95 period, a large majority had exercise prices reset to the market price. This resulted in a reduction of the typical option's exercise price by about 40%. Slightly less than half of these options also had their maturities extended, generally receiving a new expiration of 10 years. We find that resetting has a strong negative relationship with firm performance even after correcting for industry performance. Resetting is also significantly more common among small firms than among large firms. However, few other industry- or firm-specific factors appear to matter. Finally, we find that the possibility of resetting does not have a large impact on the ex-ante value of an option award, but the ex-post gain can be substantial.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- in its series New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires with number 98-010.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 08 Feb 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:98-010

Contact details of provider:
Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Wei Xiong & Ronnie Sircar, 2004. "Evaluating Incentive Options," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 253, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chongwoo Choe, 2001. "Leverage, Volatility and Executive Stock Options," Discussion Paper Series a420, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Darsinos, T. & Satchell, S.E., 2002. "On the Valuation of Warrants and Executive Stock Options: Pricing Formulae for Firms with Multiple Warrants/Executive Options," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0218, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  4. Choe, Chongwoo & Yin, Xiangkang, 2006. "Should executive stock options be abandoned?," MPRA Paper 13760, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matthias Benz & Marcel Kucher & Alois Stutzer, . "Are Stock Options the Managers' Blessing? Stock Option Compensation and Institutional Controls," IEW - Working Papers iewwp061, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hess, Dieter E. & Lüders, Erik, 2001. "Accounting for stock-based compensation : an extended clean surplus relation," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-42, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2002. "Managing Option Fragility," NBER Working Papers 9059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Casamatta, Catherine & Gümbel, Alexander, 2007. "Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment and Strategic Inertia," IDEI Working Papers 442, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  9. Timothy B. Folta & Jonathan P. O'Brien, 2008. "Determinants of firm-specific thresholds in acquisition decisions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2-3), pages 209-225. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.