Egalitarianism: Is Leximin the Only Option?
AbstractIt has been argued that any plausible egalitarian theory should give asbolute priority to the worst off in a conflict with the best off in society. In this paper, we show that this framework is closely linked to the leximin approach, and on the basis of a condition named the conditional contracting extremes, we provide characterisations of both the maximin and the leximin principle. Moreover, we argue that this condition is too strong to embrace every plausible egalitarian perspective, and suggest a weaker condition which allows for a broader view on egalitarianism.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 4/99.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
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POVERTY ; COLLECTIVE ECONOMY;
Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
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- Michele Lombardi & Roberto Veneziani, 2009.
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- Michele Lombardi & Kahame Miyagishima & Roberto Veneziani, 2013. "Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2013-07, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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- LUTTENS, Roland Iwan & OOGHE, Erwin, 2006. "Is it fair to ‘make work pay’ ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2006026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Marc Fleurbaey, 2005.
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