The Political Economy of Underinvestment in Agriculture
AbstractA simple model of political economy is constructed to capture the following view: Owners of sector-specific factors form political lobbies in order to influence government policy within the perimeter defined by the existing paradigm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number 167.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: FACULTE UNIVERSITAIRE NOTRE-DAME DE LA PAIX, FACULTE DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES, RUE DE BRUXELLES NAMUR FRANCE.
Web page: http://www.fundp.ac.be/facultes/eco/
More information through EDIRC
POLITICAL ECONOMY; AGRICULTURE; FARMING; INVESTMENTS;
Other versions of this item:
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Kotwal, Ashok, 1998. "The political economy of underinvestment in agriculture," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 233-247, February.
- Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General
- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
- Q19 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Protection For Sale,"
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- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Binswanger, Hans P. & Khandker, Shahidur R & Rosenzweig, Mark R., 1989.
"How infrastructure and financial institutions affect agricultural output and investment in India,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
163, The World Bank.
- Binswanger, Hans P. & Khandker, Shahidur R. & Rosenzweig, Mark R., 1993. "How infrastructure and financial institutions affect agricultural output and investment in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 337-366, August.
- Van Long, Ngo & Vousden, Neil, 1991. "Protectionist responses and declining industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 87-103, February.
- Spiller, Pablo T, 1990. "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed."," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 65-101, April.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
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