In this paper, we develop a theory of union bargaining power based on firm specific skills acquired by the insider workforce. We show that unions increase the bargaining power of insiders only in states of the world in which the firm would like to retain insiders but not hire outsiders.
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Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros- in its series Papers with number
9601.
Length: 42 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9601
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