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A Model of Takeovers of Foreign Banks

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Author Info

  • Repullo, R.

Abstract

This paper investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank by a domestic bank whereby the former becomes a branch of the latter. Each bank is initially supervised by a national agency that cares about closure costs and deposit insurance payouts, and may decide the early closure of the bank on the basis of supervisory information. Under the principle of home country control, the takeover moves responsibility for both the supervision of the foreign bank and the insurance of the foreign deposits to the domestic agency.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros- in its series Papers with number 0015.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:cemfdt:0015

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Postal: Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros. Casado del Alisal, 5-28014 Madrid, Spain.
Phone: 914290551
Fax: 914291056
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Web page: http://www.cemfi.es/
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Related research

Keywords: BANKS ; MERGERS ; INSURANCE;

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Cited by:
  1. Pijoan-Mas, Josep, 2005. "Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Does Financial Integration Make Banks Act More Prudential? Regulation, Foreign Owned Banks, and the Lender-of-Last Resort," HWWA Discussion Papers 339, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
  3. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland.
  4. Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Morrison, Alan, 2003. "Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Helge Berger & Carsten Hefeker, 2008. "Does financial integration make banks more vulnerable? Regulation, foreign owned banks, and the lender-of-last resort," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 371-393, February.
  6. Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2005. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4990, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka & Mälkönen, Ville, 2009. "Blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions for multinational banks in a bargaining model," Research Discussion Papers 16/2009, Bank of Finland.
  8. Buch, Claudia M. & DeLong, Gayle, 2008. "Do weak supervisory systems encourage bank risk-taking?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 23-39, April.
  9. Claudia M. Buch & Gayle L. DeLong, 2001. "Cross-Border Bank Mergers: What Lures the Rare Animal?," Kiel Working Papers 1070, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  10. Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2005. "Regulation of multinational banks: a theoretical inquiry," Working Paper Series 0431, European Central Bank.
  11. Amihud, Yakov & DeLong, Gayle L. & Saunders, Anthony, 2002. "The effects of cross-border bank mergers on bank risk and value," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 857-877, November.
  12. Mälkönen, Ville & Niinimäki, J.-P., 2012. "Blanket guarantee, deposit insurance and restructuring decisions for multinational banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 84-95.

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