We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, as by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. We find that both when politicians do and do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which politicians avoid evaluation, or prefer evaluation by a body which can poorly discriminate between good and bad actions. The ability of voters to distinguish between good and bad politicians may therefore be limited.
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Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number
99-00-13.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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