Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

On the Choice of Insurance Distribution Systems

Contents:

Author Info

  • Joong, K.W.
  • mayers, D.
  • Smith, C.V.
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We examine insurers' choice between independent and exclusive agents. We assume that alternative distribution systems are efficient mechanisms for controlling contracting problems among policyholders, insurers, and agents. Because the use of independent agents helps control potential expropriative behavior by the insurer, the independent agency system should be more valuable for ownership structures where such problems are more severe. Thus, ownership structures and distribution systems are strategic compliments. We test this theory by analyzing the association between distribution-system choice and the firm's ownership structure, lines of insurance, advertising policy, size, geographic concentration, and cost structure among property-casualty insurers.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management. University of California Riverside in its series The A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management with number 96-15.

    as in new window
    Length: 27 pages
    Date of creation: 1996
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:fth:caland:96-15

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: The A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management. University of California, Riverside. Riverside CA 92521
    Web page: http://www.agsm.ucr.edu/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: INSURANCE ; CONTRACTS;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Patricia Born & M. Martin Boyer, 2008. "Claims-Made and Reported Policies and Insurer Profitability in Medical Malpractice," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-13, CIRANO.
    2. Hecht, Jason, 1999. "Modeling market shares of the leading personal automobile insurance companies," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 279-296, May.
    3. Martina Eckardt & Solvig Räthke-Döppner, 2010. "The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services-Empirical Evidence for Germany," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 667-701.
    4. Sonnenholzner, Michael & Wambach, Achim, 2006. "On the role of patience in an insurance market with asymmetric information," CFS Working Paper Series 2007/04, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    5. Lee, Soon-Jae & Mayers, David & Smith Jr., Clifford W., 1997. "Guaranty funds and risk-taking Evidence from the insurance industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 3-24, April.
    6. Damian Ward & Igor Filatotchev, 2010. "Principal-principal-agency relationships and the role of external governance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(4), pages 249-261.
    7. Parente, Ronaldo & Choi, Byeongyong Paul & Slangen, Arjen H.L. & Ketkar, Sonia, 2010. "Distribution system choice in a service industry: An analysis of international insurance firms operating in the United States," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 275-287, September.
    8. Strauss, Jason, 2007. "Price Regulation, Market Exit, and Financial Leverage of Canadian Property-Liability Insurers," MPRA Paper 11212, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Oct 2008.
    9. Sass, Tim R., 2005. "The competitive effects of exclusive dealing: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 203-225, April.
    10. Venezia, Itzhak & Galai, Dan & Shapira, Zur, 1999. "Exclusive vs. independent agents: a separating equilibrium approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 443-456, December.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:caland:96-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.