Averaged Predictions and the Learning of Equilibrium Play
AbstractThe main objects here are noncooperative games in which all externalities occur via a one-dimensional variable. So-called mean-value iterates are used to approach Nash equilibrium. The proposed schemes generalize many received methods, and can be interpreted as learning taking place during repeated play. An important feature is that no player need to be fully informed about the game structure. Particular examples include Cournot oligopolies and some nonatomic market games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 178.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
More information through EDIRC
GAMES ; LEARNING;
Other versions of this item:
- Flam, Sjur Didrik, 1998. "Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 833-848, June.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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MIT Press Books,
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edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, January.
- Sjur Didrik Flåm, 2002. "Convexity, Differential Equations, and Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 655, CESifo Group Munich.
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- Flam, S.D. & Horvath, C., 1998. "Stochastic Mean-Values, Rational Expectations, and Price Movements," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0998, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
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