Stackelberg Leadership and Transfers in Private Provision of Public Goods
AbstractWe consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 170.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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GAMES ; PUBLIC GOODS;
Other versions of this item:
- (*), Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Buchholz & Kjell Erik Lommerud, 1997. "Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 29-43.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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