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The Power of Woke and Other Forms of Disproportionate Punishment

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  • Lars Gårn Hansen

    (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

I suggest that simple enforcement and lobbying models may explain how a small minority of dedicated believers (religious fundamentalists, animal rights activists, woke activists, etc.) are able to impose changes in behavior on the majority in a society who do not believe. With this, a society typically has two stable states: one with and one without the majority changing behavior. I show how activists can facilitate transition to their preferred state by focusing punishment on subsets of the behavior they want to change and on subgroups of the majority one at a time, as well as by exploiting inherent advantages they have in lobbying the leadership of subgroups with power hierarchies (corporations, universities, organizations, etc.). The willingness of dedicated believers to inflict highly disproportionate punishment on members of the majority turns out to be critical for their ability to facilitate transition. I show that transition to the state in which the majority changes behavior may substantially reduce social welfare. I conclude with a discussion of strategies for avoiding transition, which the majority may consider.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Gårn Hansen, 2023. "The Power of Woke and Other Forms of Disproportionate Punishment," IFRO Working Paper 2023/01, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:foi:wpaper:2023_01
    as

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    File URL: http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/WPpdf/WP2023/IFRO_WP_2023_01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Woke activism; Private enforcement; Lobbying.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • P4 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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