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Unsecured debt with public insurance : from bad to worse Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Kartik Athreya
Nicole B. Simpson
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In U.S. data, income interruptions, the receipt of public insurance, and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related. The central contribution of this paper is to evaluate both bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other. Specifically, we explicitly allow for distortions created by the default option and public insurance to affect 1) risk-taking, 2) borrowing, and 3) search effort. Our analysis delivers two striking conclusions. First, we find that U.S. personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier to allowing the public insurance system to improve welfare. Second, contrary to popular belief, we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more, not less, bankruptcy.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number
03-14.
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Date of creation: 2004Date of revision:
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Keywords: Bankruptcy Unemployment Other versions of this item:
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Igor Livshits & James MacGee & Michele Tertilt, 2003.
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Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control ,
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"Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(3), pages 523-42, July.
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