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Economics and the design of patent systems

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Author Info
Robert M. Hunt

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Abstract

The author uses intuition derived from several of his research papers to make three points. First, in the absence of a common law balancing test, application of uniform patentability criteria favors some industries over others. Policymakers must decide the optimal tradeoff across industries. Second, if patent rights are not closely related to the underlying inventions, more patenting may reduce R&D in industries that are both R&D and patent intensive. Third, for reasons largely unrelated to intellectual property, the U.S. private innovation system has become far more decentralized than it was a generation ago. It is reasonable to inquire whether a patent system that worked well in an era of more centralized innovation functions as well for the more decentralized environment of today.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 07-6.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:07-6

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  1. Robert Hunt & James Bessen, 2004. "The software patent experiment," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q3, pages 22-32. [Downloadable!]
  2. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-69, September. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Robert M. Hunt, 2006. "When Do More Patents Reduce R&D?," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001065, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Robert M. Hunt, 2002. "Patentability, industry structure, and innovation," Working Papers 01-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Paul Klemperer, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Jay Pil Choi, 2003. "Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Moschini, GianCarlo & Yerokhin, Oleg, 2006. "Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive for Sequential Innovation," Staff General Research Papers 12598, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Robert M. Hunt & Leonard I. Nakamura, 2006. "The Democratization of U.S. Research and Development after 1980," 2006 Meeting Papers 121, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.


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