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When do more patents reduce R&D?

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Author Info
Robert M. Hunt

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Abstract

This paper develops a simple duopoly model in which investments in R&D and patents are inputs in the production of firm rents. Patents are necessary to appropriate the returns to the firm’s own R&D, but patents also create potential claims against the rents of rival firms. Analysis of the model reveals a general necessary condition for the existence of a positive correlation between the firm’s R&D intensity and the number of patents it obtains. When that condition is violated, changes in exogenous parameters that induce an increase in firms’ patenting can also induce a decline in R&D intensity. Such a negative relationship is more likely when (1) there is sufficient overlap in firms’ technologies so that each firm’s inventions are likely to infringe the patents of another firm, (2) firms are sufficiently R&D intensive, and (3) patents are cheap relative to both the cost of R&D and the value of final output.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 06-6.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:06-6

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Related research
Keywords: Patents ; Research and development;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, 2007. "An Empirical Look at Software Patents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 157-189, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-69, September. [Downloadable!]
  3. Robert M. Hunt, 1999. "Nonobviousness and the incentive to innovate: an economic analysis of intellectual property reform," Working Papers 99-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bronwyn H. Hall, 2004. "Exploring the Patent Explosion," NBER Working Papers 10605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Lee, Tom & Wilde, Louis L, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-36, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 106-112, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Robert M. Hunt, 2006. "When Do More Patents Reduce R&D?," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001065, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. James Bessen, 2004. "Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies," Working Papers 0401, Research on Innovation. [Downloadable!]
  11. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1985. "Innovation and Industry Evolution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(1), pages 81-99, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements," Law and Economics 0303004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Klemperer, Paul, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," CEPR Discussion Papers 392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Robert M. Hunt, 2004. "Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(3), pages 401-425, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Jay Pil Choi, 2003. "Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert M. Hunt, 2006. "When Do More Patents Reduce R&D?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 87-91, May. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Robert M. Hunt, 2007. "Economics and the design of patent systems," Working Papers 07-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Guido Cozzi & Silvia Galli, 2009. "Science-Based R&D in Schumpeterian Growth," Working Papers 2009_19, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alexandre Almeida & Aurora A.C. Teixeira, 2007. "Does Patenting negatively impact on R&D investment?An international panel data assessment," FEP Working Papers 255, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alexandre Almeida & Aurora A.C. Teixeira, 2008. "One size does not fit all… An economic development perspective on the asymmetric impact of Patents on R&D," FEP Working Papers 292, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto. [Downloadable!]
  6. Guido Cozzi & Silvia Galli, 2009. "Upstream Innovation Protection: Common Law Evolution and the Dynamics of Wage Inequality," Working Papers 2009_20, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
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