Organizations in economic analysis
AbstractThree economic environments are reviewed, and in each organizations play an essential role. For an adverse selection insurance economy, we find that when mutual insurance arrangements are permitted an equilibrium necessarily exists and is optimal. This example, and the two others, illustrate the problems that may result from imposing organizational structure on an environment rather than permitting the structure to be determined endogenously.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Working Papers with number 385.
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Canadian Journal of Economics (Vol 21, Num 3, August 1988, pp. 477-491)
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