Organizations in economic analysis

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Organizations in economic analysis

Author Info

John H. Boyd
Edward C. Prescott
Bruce D. Smith

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Abstract

Three economic environments are reviewed, and in each organizations play an essential role. For an adverse selection insurance economy, we find that when mutual insurance arrangements are permitted an equilibrium necessarily exists and is optimal. This example, and the two others, illustrate the problems that may result from imposing organizational structure on an environment rather than permitting the structure to be determined endogenously.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Working Papers with number 385.

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Date of creation: 1988
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Publication status: Published in Canadian Journal of Economics (Vol 21, Num 3, August 1988, pp. 477-491)
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:385

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Article
- John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott & Bruce D. Smith, 1988. "Organizations in Economic Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 477-91, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1993. "Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening," Finance 9310001, EconWPA, revised 02 Nov 1993. [Downloadable!]
Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2005. "Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2006. "Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 485-516, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lazarova, Emiliya & Borm, Peter & Velzen, Bas van, 2005. "Contracts and insurance group formation by myopic players," Discussion Paper 89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Papers 107, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1994. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1990. "A "coalition proof" equilibrium for a private information credit economy," Working Paper 90-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Lacker, J.M. & Weinberg, J.A., 1990. "A "Coalition Proof" Equilibrium For A Private Information Credit Economy," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 994, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Lacker, Jeffrey & Weinberg, John A, 1993. "A Coalition Proof Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 279-96, April.

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-23.

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