Consumer choice and merchant acceptance of payment media
AbstractWe study the ability of banks and merchants to influence the consumer's payment instrument choice. Consumers participate in payment card networks to insure themselves against three types of shocks -- income, theft, and their merchant match. Merchants choose which payment instruments to accept based on their production costs and increased profit opportunities. Our key results can be summarized as follows. The structure of prices is determined by the level of the bank's cost to provide payment services including the level of aggregate credit loss, the probability of theft, and the timing of income inflows. We also identify equilibria where the bank finds it profitable to offer one or both payment cards. Our model predicts that when merchants are restricted to charging a uniform price for goods that they sell, the bank benefits while consumers and merchants are worse off. Finally, we compare welfare-maximizing price structures to those that result from the bank's profit-maximizing price structure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Working Paper Series with number WP-08-11.
Date of creation: 2008
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Other versions of this item:
- Wilko Bolt & Sujit Chakravorti, 2008. "Consumer Choice and Merchant Acceptance of Payment Media," DNB Working Papers 197, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-14 (All new papers)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Credit card payment fees need regulation
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-02-02 14:23:00
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