Private investment and sovereign debt negotiations
AbstractThe author studies models of sovereign debt bargaining of the kind proposed by J. Bulow and K. Rogoff. All agents act rationally with perfect foresight and perfect information. The main departure from previous studies is that the government of the debtor country acts on behalf of, but is not identical to, its representative citizen. This seemingly minor change surprisingly implies that there is an indeterminacy of bargaining outcomes, including some of the sunspots type; agreement may be delayed for many periods; and marginal debt may not be worthless. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number 93-8.
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Chang, Roberto, 1995. "Private Investment and Sovereign Debt Negotiations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 387-405, May.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995.
NBER Working Papers
5131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eaton, J. & Fernandez, R., 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Papers 37, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 59, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Klimenko, Mikhail M., 2002. "Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 177-209, October.
- Mark L. J. Wright, 2004.
"Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk,"
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun.
- Wright, Mark L.J., 2006. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 120-149, June.
- Mark L . J. Wright, 2004. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Working Paper Series 2004-34, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Pierpaolo Giannoccolo, 2004. "The Brain Drain. A Survey of the Literature," Working Papers 20060302, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica, revised Mar 2006.
- Chang, Roberto, 1998.
"Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-255, April.
- Roberto Chang, 1995. "Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth," Working Paper 95-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Meredith Rector).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.