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Optimal Patent Length in a North-South Framework

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Abstract

Under certain conditions it is optimal for the noninnovating south to give patent protection for a longer time period than the innovating north. A cooperative patent agreement involves a larger protection by each country compared to the non-cooperative situation. [WP 9].

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  • Swapnendu Banerjee, 2008. "Optimal Patent Length in a North-South Framework," Working Papers id:1322, eSocialSciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diwan, Ishac & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Patents, appropriate technology, and North-South trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 27-47, February.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring.
    3. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 106-112, Spring.
    4. Fosfuri, Andrea, 2000. "Patent protection, imitation and the mode of technology transfer," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1129-1149, October.
    5. Keith E. Maskus, 1990. "Normative Concerns in the International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 387-409, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bhan, Aditya & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2014. "Incentives for product and process innovations: a case for the drug industry," MPRA Paper 61030, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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