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A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

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  • Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor
  • García Enríquez, Javier
  • Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos

Abstract

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

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Paper provided by University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II in its series DFAEII Working Papers with number DFAEII;2012-17.

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Date of creation: Nov 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:9151

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Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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Keywords: strategic delegation; bargaining; product substitutability; price;

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  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  2. Arjen van Witteloostuijn & Thijs Jansen & Arie van Lier, 2007. "Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 897-904.
  3. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
  4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
  5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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