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Designing an incentive-compatible safety net in a financial system in transition: the case of Serbia

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  • Srdjan T. Marinkovic
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    Abstract

    This paper looks at banking as a regulated industry. Inequality of information among various participants is assumed as well as the existence of different incentives. The paper argues that regulation in general and a safety net in particular are necessary to make the financial service industry operate in a safe and appropriate way. From this vantage point, transition banking and, more closely, peculiarities of the Serbian system are analysed. Some guidelines for redesigning the existing safety net in Serbian banking are proposed.

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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23375/
    File Function: Open access version.
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 23375.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:23375

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    17. Kane, Edward J., 1986. "Appearance and reality in deposit insurance: The case for reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 175-188, June.
    18. Pennacchi, George G, 1987. "A Reexamination of the Over- (or Under-) Pricing of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 340-60, August.
    19. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
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    22. Charles Goodhart, 1999. "Myths About the Lender of Last Resort," FMG Special Papers sp120, Financial Markets Group.
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