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Information acquisition, price informativeness and welfare

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  • Rahi, Rohit
  • Zigrand, Jean-Pierre

Abstract

We consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations. Private information that agents have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price. We study the learning externalities that arise in this setting, and in particular their implications for price informativeness and welfare. When private signals are noisy, so that agents rely more on the information conveyed by prices, discouraging information gathering may be Pareto improving. Complementarities in information acquisition can lead to multiple equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Rahi, Rohit & Zigrand, Jean-Pierre, 2018. "Information acquisition, price informativeness and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118935, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:118935
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/118935/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhou, Xuan & Kang, Junqing, 2023. "Searching for ESG Information: Heterogeneous Preferences and Information Acquisition," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    2. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2023. "Information, market power and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120479, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    heterogeneous valuations; information acquisition; learning externalities; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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