This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Restructuring Or Delegating: Which Is Better?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Eduardo L. Gimenez Fernandez (Departamento de Fundamentos de Analisis Economico e Historia Economica. Universidad de Vigo.)
Manuel Gonzalez-Gomez (Departamento de Fundamentos de Analisis Economico e Historia Economica. Universidad de Vigo.)
Abstract

In a certain industry, a given firm is operating with high costs of production and does not know if this is because the production costs in this industry are intrinsically high or because it is inefficient. To resolve this uncertainty, it must choose between continuing to produce correcting the inefficiency by itself (restructuring) or transfering a part or all its business to another firm of the same industry which is already efficient (subcontracting or delegating). Furthermore, regarding the policies of delegating, we consider two, temporary delegation (renting) and definitive delegation (selling). This paper justifies the existence of policies both of restructuring and subcontracting in a context of asymmetric information.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://idegaweb.usc.es/repec/docs/anecon/analise19.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 500 Failed to connect to FTP server idegaweb.usc.es: Net::FTP: connect: timeout. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Carlos Dabarca)
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia in its series Documentos de trabajo - Análise Económica with number 0019.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edg:anecon:0019

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Campus Universitario Sur, 15706 Santiago de Compostela
Phone: 981 59 11 66
Fax: 981 59 99 35
Email:
Web page: http://idegaweb.usc.es/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Carlos Dabarca).

Related research
Keywords: Delegation; Transfer of production; Restructuring;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1992. "Coordination in Split Award Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 681-707, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 1987. "Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price Competition in Defense Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 57-76, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.