Voting Leaders and Voting Participation
AbstractWe model electoral competition between two parties in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium larger elections are characterized by a higher participation rate. Moreover, no matter what the voters' preferences are, parties spend exactly the same amounts for their campain in equilibrium. Platforms converge to the center (median voter) and spending increases as the uncertainty over voters' preferences decreases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings with number 319.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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More information through EDIRC
Voter's Paradox; Aggregate Uncertainty.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-10-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2004-10-30 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barry Nalebuff & Roni Shachar, 1997.
"Follow The Leader: Theory And Evidence On Political Participation,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm57, Yale School of Management.
- Barry Nalebuff & Ron Shachar, 1999. "Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 525-547, June.
- raphael soubeyran, 2005. "Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters' Turnout?," Public Economics 0510018, EconWPA, revised 23 Oct 2005.
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