Fahlenbrach, Rudiger (Ohio State U) Minton, Bernadette A. Pan, Carrie H.
Abstract
We study the determinants and valuation consequences of rehiring a former CEO. Rehiring is more likely after poor performance of the current CEO, if the former CEO performed well during his prior tenure and maintains strong connections to the firm, and the more intangible are the firm’s assets. While the market reacts negatively to the rehiring announcement, the accounting and stock market performances of rehired CEO firms do not differ from those of a control sample over the two years following the turnover. Our evidence suggests that firms rehiring their former CEOs hire the best available candidate given the circumstances.
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Paper provided by Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number
2007-4.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007.
"A Theory of Friendly Boards,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, 02.
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