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Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules

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  • Hartley, Roger

    (Keele University)

  • Richard Cornes

Abstract

We study joint production games under a mixed sharing rule in which part of the ouput (the mixing parameter) is shared in proportion to inputs and the rest according to exogenously determined shares. We show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium and discuss comparative statics. When the game is large, we show that players unanimously prefer the same value of the mixing parameter: the equilibrium elasticity of production. At this value, the equilibrium allocation is fully efficient. Our approach heavily exploits the fact that payoffs depend only on a player's input and the aggregate input.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 99.

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Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:99

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Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/society/annualconf.asp
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Related research

Keywords: production externalities; non-cooperative games;

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Cited by:
  1. Alex Dickson & Roger Hartley, 2007. "The strategic Marshallian cross," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2007/13, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  2. Ji-Tian Jeng, 2005. "Bayesian-Cournot Competition," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2005/01, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  3. R Cornes & R Hartley, 2005. "The Geometry of Aggregative Games," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0514, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  4. A. Dickson & R. Hartley, 2005. "The strategic Marshallian cross and bilateral oligopoly," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0523, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  5. Alex Dickson & Roger Hartley, 2004. "Partial Equilibrium Analysis in a Market Game:the Strategic Marshallian Cross," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2004/07, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  6. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2012. "Fully aggregative games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 631-633.

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