Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules
AbstractWe study joint production games under a mixed sharing rule in which part of the ouput (the mixing parameter) is shared in proportion to inputs and the rest according to exogenously determined shares. We show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium and discuss comparative statics. When the game is large, we show that players unanimously prefer the same value of the mixing parameter: the equilibrium elasticity of production. At this value, the equilibrium allocation is fully efficient. Our approach heavily exploits the fact that payoffs depend only on a player's input and the aggregate input.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 99.
Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
production externalities; non-cooperative games;
Other versions of this item:
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules," Game Theory and Information 0211003, EconWPA.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/16, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-06-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2003-06-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2003-06-16 (Public Economics)
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- Ji-Tian Jeng, 2005. "Bayesian-Cournot Competition," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2005/01, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- R Cornes & R Hartley, 2005. "The Geometry of Aggregative Games," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0514, Economics, The University of Manchester.
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- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2012.
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