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Manager Unethical Behavior During The New Economy Bubble

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  • Vranceanu, Radu

    ()
    (ESSEC Business School)

Abstract

This paper investigates factors that brought about the surge in manager unethical behavior within the US economy. Key structural causes are the weak internal control, perverse incentives related to managers’ compensation, conflicts of interest in the banking and auditing sectors. Unethical behavior was further enhanced by the large economic noise specific to the IT bubble, which emerged in the late nineties against the background of increased deregulation in the goods and financial markets. The US administration opposed to the proliferation of CEO unethical behavior the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; we argue why some of its provisions might be taken one step further

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number DR 03026.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-03026

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Postal: ESSEC Research Center, BP 105, 95021 Cergy, France
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Web page: http://www.essec.edu/
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Related research

Keywords: Unethical behavior; CEOs; Financial deregulation; Activism; Sarbanes-Oxely Act;

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