This paper considers a pollution and control game which uses a queuing framework. This framework allows an accounting of pollution events, environmental pollution quality and the application of controls to maintain a desirable quality of the environment. A number of examples are used to highlight the approach and demonstrates both its theoretical and practical usefulness.
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Paper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number
DR 03013.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q26 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources
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