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An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights

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  • Atsushi Tsuneki

Abstract

We develop an evolutionary game model to reveal the theoretical basis for the assignment of property right, where both plaintiff and defendant argue for their rights by claiming their reliance investment. We allow for the possibility that the value of the total product depend not only on the investment conferred by the owner but also on the reliance investment provided by the trespasser. The resulting evolutionary stable set of preferences shows that the endowment effect hardwired to the owners and trespassers depends on the difference of productivities among both parties and the density of owners within the population.

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  • Atsushi Tsuneki, 2017. "An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights," ISER Discussion Paper 1010, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1010
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    File URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2017/DP1010.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010. "Property Rights and Economic Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595, Elsevier.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Mukesh Eswaran & Hugh M. Neary, 2014. "An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Emergence of Property Rights," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 203-226, August.
    4. Ross Cressman, 2009. "Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 221-247, June.
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