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An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Emergence of Property Rights

Author

Listed:
  • Mukesh Eswaran
  • Hugh M. Neary

Abstract

We model the emergence of an innate, biological sense of property rights where resource scarcity and output contestability reign. Preferences evolve such that, in evolutionarily stable equilibrium, an object is valued more by an individual who possesses it, or has produced it, than if he is neither possessor nor producer. In a distributional contest for the object, the possessor/producer will devote more effort to retaining it than an interloper will to expropriating it. Asymmetry in preferences for an object between possessor/producer and interloper, and consequent asymmetry of efforts defending or expropriating it, constitute our concept of innate property rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Mukesh Eswaran & Hugh M. Neary, 2014. "An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Emergence of Property Rights," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 203-226, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:3:p:203-26
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.203
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2020. "The Volunteer’s Dilemma in Finite Populations," CEPR Discussion Papers 15536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Faillo, Marco & Rizzolli, Matteo & Tontrup, Stephan, 2019. "Thou shalt not steal: Taking aversion with legal property claims," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 88-101.
    3. Joseph Y. Halpern & Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2022. "The Benefits of Coarse Preferences," Papers 2201.10141, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    4. Bharat Goel & Arijit Sen, 2019. "Appropriative Conflicts and the Evolution of Property Rights," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    5. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2021. "The volunteer’s dilemma in finite populations," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 1277-1290, September.
    6. Tilman Hartley, 2019. "The continuing evolution of ownership," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(2), pages 1-22, February.
    7. Korenok, Oleg & Millner, Edward L. & Razzolini, Laura, 2018. "Taking aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 397-403.
      • Korenok Oleg & Edward L. Millner & Laura Razzolini, 2017. "Taking Aversion," Working Papers 1702, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
    8. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2020. "Property Out of Conflict: A Survey and Some New Results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 891-927.
    9. Karel Zeman, 2018. "Analýza teorie vlastnických práv [Theory of Ownership Rights Analysis]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2018(1), pages 99-115.
    10. Eswaran, Mukesh, 2018. "Decentralized Terrorism and Social Identity," Microeconomics.ca working papers tina_marandola-2018-4, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Jun 2018.
    11. Atsushi Tsuneki, 2017. "An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights," ISER Discussion Paper 1010, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    12. De Geest, Lawrence R. & Kidwai, Abdul H. & Portillo, Javier E., 2022. "Ours, not yours: Property rights, poaching and deterrence in common-pool resources," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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