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Accidents, Liability Obligations and Monopolized Markets for Spare Parts: Profits and Social Welfare

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  • Pio Baake

Abstract

We analyze the effects of accidents and liability obligations on the incentives of car manufacturers to monopolize the markets for their spare parts. We show that monopolized markets for spare parts lead to higher overall expenditures for consumers. Furthermore, while the manufacturers invest more in order to offer cars with higher qualities, monopolization tends to reduce social welfare. Key for these results is the observation that high prices for spare parts entail a negative external effect inasmuch as liability obligations imply that consumers of competing products have to pay the high prices as well.

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File URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.82271.de/dp782.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 782.

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Length: 22 p.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp782

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Keywords: aftermarkets; monopolization; liability;

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  1. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2001. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets," NBER Working Papers 8086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Emch Eric R., 2003. "Price Discrimination via Proprietary Aftermarkets," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-34, April.
  3. Schwartz, M. & Werden, G.J., 1995. "A Quality-Signaling Rationale for Aftermarket Tying," Papers, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division 95-01, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
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