Social Expenditures as a Political Cue Ball?: OECD Countries under Examination
AbstractThis paper examines how policy affects social expenditures. Analyzing an OECD panel from 1980 to 2003, five political variables are tested: Election- and pre-election years, the ideological party composition of the governments, the number of coalition partners and the fact, if the ruling government has a majority in parliament or not (minority government). I find that neither of these variables have an impact on social expenditures using different model set-ups. The influence of national governments seems to be limited by the globalization, which indeed impairs social expenditures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 676.
Length: 21 + Anh. p.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
social expenditures; electoral cycles; partisan politics; globalisation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-03-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2007-03-31 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-03-31 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Niklas Potrafke, 2006. "Political Effects on the Allocation of Public Expenditures: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 653, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
- Ozlem Onaran & Valerie Boesch & Markus Leibrecht, 2012. "How Does Globalization Affect The Implicit Tax Rates On Labor Income, Capital Income, And Consumption In The European Union?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(4), pages 880-904, October.
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