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Institutionnalisation des régimes de gouvernance et rôle des institutions socles:le cas de la cogestion allemande

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Author Info
Pierre-Yves Gomez () (EM Lyon - Institut Français de Gouvernement des Entreprises)
Peter Wirtz () (Université Lumière (Lyon 2) – COACTIS (EA 4161) et IFGE)

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Abstract

(VF)L’un des traits distinctifs du système de gouvernance à l’allemande est la représentation paritaire des salariés au sein des conseils de surveillance des grandes entreprises. Souvent considérée comme «culturellement» allemande, le présent article montre cependant qu’une supposée «tradition allemande» de cogestion relève du mythe. Le régime de gouvernance allemand est plutôt le fruit du contexte politique et institutionnel dramatique de la fin des années 1940 qui a vu des luttes et la mobilisation des acteurs politiques, économiques et syndicaux. Pour expliquer qu’un consensus institutionnel sur la cogestion ait finalement eu lieu en Allemagne dans une période de chaos institutionnel, nous montrons le rôle méconnu joué par l’Église catholique allemande. À la fois étrangère par nature à la question du gouvernement des entreprises, mais fortement impliquée dans les réflexions sur l’organisation du pouvoir économique avant et après la seconde guerre mondiale, elle a constitué une «institution socle» à partir de laquelle les effets de mobilisation ont pu générer un consensus sur la cogestion, qui s’est s’institutionnalisé dans le modèle dual paritaire, considéré depuis comme «typiquement germanique».(VA) Codetermined supervisory boards with half of the directors representing employees are one of the distinctive features of the German corporate governance system. This is often supposed to be rooted in typically “German culture”. The present contribution reveals however that this supposedly “German tradition” is a myth. The specific regime of codetermined supervisory boards is rather the outcome of the dramatic political and institutional circumstances of the late nineteen-forties, having witnessed a fierce fight and the mobilization of various actors ranging from politicians and industrialists to trade unionists. On the way to an institutional consensus, the German catholic church played a significant, albeit seldom recognized, role. It acted as a “base institution” positively influencing the efforts of mobilization in favor of board codetermination and making an agreement possible.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1080601.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1080601

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Related research
Keywords: cogestion; mobilisation; institution socle; Eglise catholique; codetermination; mobilization; base institution; catholic church.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Corporation and Securities Law
P11 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Mary O'Sullivan, 1998. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Germany," Macroeconomics 9805004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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